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The pre-existing duty rule is said to have done the most in giving the doctrine of 
consideration a bad name.1 It stands for the orthodoxy that a promise to perform 
a pre-existing contractual duty is no consideration,2 but sits uneasily with other 
aspects of the consideration doctrine,3 and is routinely circumvented through a 
number of ‘avoidance techniques’.4 Since the English Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd,5 the rule appears to have been 
all but emaciated, prompting not only calls for the abolition of consideration in 
the context of contract modifications,6 but also in the more general context of 
contract formation.7 Indeed, two Commonwealth cases, namely, Antons Trawling 
Co Ltd v Smith8 and NAV Canada v Greater Frederiction Airport Authority Inc,9 have since 
taken a definitive step in that direction by holding that a promise to pay more for 
* Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.
1 Edwin Patterson, ‘An Apology for Consideration’ (1958) 58 Columbia Law Review 929, 936.
2 Stilk v Myrick [1809] EWHC KB J58 (King’s Bench Division (KBD)).
3 For instance, that a promise to give up a groundless claim is good consideration (Callisher v Bischoffsheim 
LR (1869–70) LR 5 QB 449 (Queen’s Bench Division (QBD))), and that the performance of a pre-
existing duty to a third-party is good consideration (Shadwell v Shadwell [1860] EWHC CP J88 (Court 
of Common Pleas (CPP))). See James Ames, ‘Two Theories of Consideration’ (1899) 12 Harvard Law 
Review 67.
4 Reiter lists four: (1) finding a promise to do more than what one has previously undertaken to do; 
(2) finding that a pre-existing promise is good consideration in changed circumstances; (3) through a 
number of reliance-based concepts including estoppels and waivers; and (4) by finding that parties 
had abandoned a pre-existing contract and entered into a ‘new’ contract. See Barry Reiter, ‘Courts, 
Consideration and Common Sense’ (1977) 27 University of Toronto Law Journal 439, 474. 
5 [1991] 1 QB 1 (Court of Appeal (CA)).
6 See Roger Halson, ‘Sailors, Sub-Contractors and Consideration’ (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 
183, 184–85; Andrew Phang, ‘Consideration at the Crossroads’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 
21, 21–22.
7 Modern examples may be found in a trilogy of Singaporean decisions: Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.
com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 (Singapore High Court (SHC)); Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng 
Khim Ming Eric [2007] 1 SLR(R) 853 (Singapore Court of Appeal (SCA)); and Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze 
Tie Terrence Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 (SCA). See also Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Consideration and 
Serious Intention’ [2009] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 434; and Koo Zhi Xuan, ‘Envisioning 
the Judicial Abolition of The Doctrine of Consideration in Singapore’ (2011) 23 Singapore Academy 
of Law Journal 463. 
8 [2003] 2 NZLR 23 (New Zealand Court of Appeal (NZCA)).
9 (2008) 290 DLR (4th) 405 (New Brunswick Court of Appeal (NBCA)).
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the performance of a pre-existing duty was enforceable even if unsupported by 
fresh consideration. At first sight, this is a distinctly positive development. It 
would spare the courts of the agony and embarrassment of having to invent 
consideration when there was none. It would also give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of commercial parties and restore certainty to the law. But in what 
follows, I will argue that such a view may be overly optimistic. Despite its breadth, 
the post-Williams v Roffey conception of consideration continues to serve a useful 
role. It draws attention to the exchange of value that gives promises contractual 
force in the first place, and the attainment of such value as the primary justification 
for facilitating contract modifications. Abandoning consideration is also 
unsatisfactory because the alternative concepts of ‘intention’, ‘consent’ or other 
manifestations of private autonomy are, without more, insufficient justifications 
for enforcing agreements to modify. 
B Antons trAwling Co ltd v smith
The defendant (‘ATCL’) was a fishing company that held fishing quota rights 
allocated by the New Zealand government. As they confer upon the holder the 
exclusive right to engage in commercial fishing in a designated territory, these 
fishing rights were highly valuable, the very ‘lifeblood’10 of fishing companies. In the 
early 1990s, the defendant embarked on exploratory fishing with a view to obtaining 
more fishing quota. It engaged the plaintiff (‘Smith’) as the master of one of its 
fishing trawlers on the understanding that Smith would be paid a percentage of the 
value of the catch and fish in areas where commercial fisheries for orange roughy 
(a deep-sea fish) had yet to be established.11 After several promising trips, ATCL 
also promised Smith a percentage share of the increased quota that would be issued 
should the commercial fishery for orange roughy be proven. In the event, ATCL 
was in fact issued with additional fishing quota and Smith claimed a share of that 
quota. ATCL resisted the claim, arguing, inter alia,12 that the subsequent promise 
was unenforceable for want of consideration. The Court of Appeal rejected this 
argument. ATCL was bound by its promise even if it was unsupported by 
consideration. In reaching this conclusion, Baragwanath J noted the approach 
taken in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd13 but alluded to its 
10 Antons (n 8) [5].
11 This latter understanding was not explicit on the facts but appeared to have been assumed by 
Baragwanath J. Without this crucial assumption, it would be difficult to see why there was even a 
variation of contract. See C Ulyatt, ‘The Demise of Consideration for Contract Variations’ (2003) 9 
Auckland University Law Review 1386, 1392. 
12 ATCL also unsuccessfully challenged the scope of its promise and alleged that Smith had not met 
the conditions that would entitle him to the promised reward. Antons (n 8) [59]–[85].
13 Williams v Roffey (n 5).
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problematic nature14 and preferred the more direct solution of simply dispensing 
with consideration in this context:
We are satisfied that Stilk v Myrick can no longer be taken to control such cases as Roffey 
Bros, Attorney-General for England and Wales and the present case where there is no element 
of duress or other policy factor suggesting that an agreement, duly performed, should 
not attract the legal consequences that each party must reasonably be taken to have 
expected. On the contrary, a result that deprived Mr Smith of the benefit of what Antons 
promised he should receive would be inconsistent with the essential principle underlying 
the law of contract, that the law will seek to give effect to freely accepted reciprocal 
undertakings. The importance of consideration is as a valuable signal that the parties 
intend to be bound by their agreement, rather than an end in itself. Where the parties 
have already made such intention clear by entering legal relations [and] have acted 
upon an agreement to a variation, in the absence of policy reasons to the contrary they 
should be bound by their agreement.15
On this analysis, consideration is no longer required for contract modification 
because: first, an agreement to modify a contract that is duly performed should 
be enforced because the objective of contract law is ‘to give effect to freely accepted 
reciprocal undertakings’; second, consideration is not needed because it serves no 
distinct purpose except as a ‘valuable signal’ of parties’ intention to be bound; and 
third, legal consequences should only be denied if the agreement were procured 
by duress or offends ‘other policy factor’. For Baragwanath J, contract modifications 
may be distinguished from contract formation because the former are typically 
made ‘in the context of on-going, arms-length, commercial transactions where it 
is utterly fictional to describe what is being conceded as a gift, and in which there 
ought to be a strong presumption that good commercial considerations underlie 
any seemingly detrimental modification.’16 
c nAv CAnAdA v greAter FrederiCtion Airport Authority inC
NAV Canada (‘NAV’) is a company statutorily charged with the responsibility of 
supplying aviation services and equipment and supplied such services to the 
Greater Frederiction Airport Authority Inc (‘GFAA’) under an Aviation and 
Services Facilities Agreement (‘ASF Agreement’). Sometime in 2001, GFAA 
decided to lengthen one of its runways and requested NAV to relocate its 
Instrument Landing System (‘ILS’) to the extended runway. However, instead of 
relocating the existing system, NAV decided to acquire a new component (DME) 
14 By reference to Professor Brian Coote’s criticisms of that case, which the learned judge restated as 
‘the mere performance of a duty already owed to the promisee under a contract cannot constitute 
consideration and that the only principled way to such a result is to decide that consideration should 
not be necessary for the variation of contract.’ Antons (n 8) [92].
15 Antons (n 8) [93]. 
16 Antons (n 8) [92], citing Reiter (n 4) 507. 
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for the system. While it accepted liability for the cost of purchasing the ILS under 
the AFS Agreement, NAV refused to pay for the new DME on the ground that 
the equipment was not part of the ILS. It further indicated that it would not make 
provision for the cost of the DME in its fiscal budget unless GFAA agreed to bear 
its cost. GFAA consistently denied responsibility for the capital expense but 
eventually capitulated ‘under protest’. By the time the dispute came before the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal, it was established that the DME was an integral 
component of the ILS. It was also found that under the ASF Agreement, NAV 
had the contractual authority to decide whether to purchase the new DME or 
relocate the old equipment. Having exercised its authority, NAV could not then 
offload its contractual responsibility to GFAA. In deciding whether the contract 
had been varied by GAAF’s subsequent promise to pay, Robertson JA took the 
view that the better approach was to ‘accept that a post-contractual modification, 
unsupported by consideration, may be enforceable so long as it is established that 
the variation was not procured under economic duress.’17 This meant that the 
issue before the court was not one of consideration, but of duress. 
Robertson JA cited a number of reasons for this departure from orthodoxy, the 
essence of which is the need to respect parties’ expectation: since contracting parties 
who renegotiate generally expect their agreements to be binding, the law should 
protect such expectation.18 The only exception arises where the agreement is 
induced by duress. By insisting on ‘fresh’ consideration as a condition for 
enforcement, the rule in Stilk v Myrick defeats contracting parties’ legitimate 
expectations and occasions injustice. This unhappy state of the law is exacerbated 
by the fact that the doctrine of promissory estoppel only protects a party’s 
detrimental reliance in circumstances where he is not asserting a new cause of 
action. But in Robertson JA’s view, such defects may be remedied by the 
straightforward recognition that the law enforces promises other than bargains 
when there are ‘sound reasons’19 to do so. In the context of contract variations, 
such reasons reside in the need to promote commercial efficacy and certainty:20
The reality is that existing contracts are frequently varied and modified by tacit agree-
ment in order to respond to contingencies not anticipated or identified at the time the 
initial contract was negotiated. As a matter of commercial efficacy, it becomes necessary 
at times to adjust the parties’ respective contractual obligations and the law must then 
protect their legitimate expectations that the modifications or variations will be adhered 
to and regarded as enforceable.
Interestingly, Robertson JA was anxious to defend this reform as an ‘incremental 
change’ 21 that merely builds upon the English Court of Appeal’s decision in 
17 NAV Canada (n 9) [31]. 
18 NAV Canada (n 9) [28]–[30].
19 NAV Canada (n 9) [29].
20 NAV Canada (n 9) [28].
21 NAV Canada (n 9) [32].
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Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicolls (Contractors) Ltd.22 According to the learned judge, 
it does not abrogate the rule in Stilk v Myrick but simply clarifies that ‘the rule 
should not be regarded as determinative as to whether a gratuitous promise is 
enforceable.’23 However, it is difficult to see what purpose remains for the rule to 
serve once the requirement for consideration is abandoned. It may be true, as the 
learned judge proceeded to observe, that the concept of consideration could still 
be relevant in identifying variations made under duress,24 but such an attenuated 
role is surely a departure from the classic understanding of the rule as an 
appurtenance to the doctrine of consideration.
Turning to the doctrine of economic duress, Robertson JA vigorously criticised 
the modern conception of the doctrine as one that involves the use of ‘illegitimate 
pressure’. In his view, this criterion provides no useful guidance since it 
encompasses not only unlawful threats (such as those involving tortious or 
criminal conduct) but extends also to lawful threats.25 In the context of contract 
variations, the search for ‘illegitimate pressure’ will often prove elusive since ‘a 
threatened breach of contract is not only lawful but in fact constitutes a right 
which can be exercised subject to the obligation to pay damages and possibly to 
an order for specific performance’.26 Likewise, no illegitimacy is inherent in a 
demand for more payment or service. That being the case, the ‘illegitimate 
pressure’ test invariably starts on the supposition that threatened breaches of 
contracts constitute legitimate commercial pressure and does not provide a 
template for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate pressure.27
For Robertson JA, a contractual variation is enforceable if it is the product of 
a consensual agreement, and a party has not consented if he acted under duress.28 
That being the case, the correct test for economic duress must be one that is 
directed at establishing the absence of consent. To this end, Robertson JA 
identified two threshold conditions: first, the promise must have been procured 
by the exercise of pressure in the form of a demand or threat, and second, the 
coerced party must have had no practical alternative but to agree to the coercer’s 
demand.29 If either threshold condition is not met, the plea of economic duress 
must fail. In particular, the victim’s lack of practical alternatives is critical because 
it is good evidence that he did not in fact consent.30 But the absence of alternatives, 
22 NAV Canada (n 9) [27].
23 NAV Canada (n 9) [32].
24 NAV Canada (n 9) [32].
25 NAV Canada (n 9) [43].
26 NAV Canada (n 9) [46], citing Hillspring Farms Ltd v Leland Walton & Sons Ltd [2007] NBCA 7, (2007) 
312 NBR (2d) 109 (NBCA).But see the criticisms of Rick Bigwood, ‘Doctrinal Reform and Post-
Contractual Modifications in New Brunswick: Nav Canada v Greater Fredericton Airport Authority Inc’ 
(2010) 49 Canadian Business Law Journal 256, 273. 
27 NAV Canada (n 9) [47]. 
28 NAV Canada (n 9) [52]. 
29 NAV Canada (n 9) [53].
30 NAV Canada (n 9) [55].
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whilst a necessary condition to establish lack of consent, is not by itself sufficient; 
other factors including whether the promise was supported by consideration, 
whether the victim made the promise ‘under protest’ or ‘without prejudice’, and 
whether he had taken reasonable and timely steps to rescind the agreement must 
be assessed to determine the reality of the victim’s consent.31 Crucially, this 
analytical framework does not include other factors, such as whether the victim 
had access to independent legal advice or whether the coercer acted in good faith, 
as integral components of the doctrine. A party with access to independent legal 
advice may still have been coerced if the effect of the pressure was to leave him 
with no other practical option.32 Likewise, the coercer’s lack of bad faith is not a 
defence if the evidence on the whole pointed to the lack of true consent.33 
Ultimately, it is not the legitimacy of the pressure but its impact on the victim that is 
decisive.34
Applying these principles to the facts, Robertson JA found that GFAA had 
acted under economic duress.35 NAV had threatened to withhold performance 
the effect of which was to leave GFAA with no workable alternative but to concede 
since NAV held an effective monopoly over the provision of the relevant aviation 
services. The variation was not supported by fresh consideration, the agreement 
was made under protest, and no payment was in fact made by GFAA. All these 
considerations pointed to the lack of true consent.
d PrActIcAl BenefIts
In Antons, Baragwanath J endorsed Williams v Roffey as an alternative means of 
upholding contract modifications that is not dissimilar in effect to the dispensation 
of consideration.36 Likewise, Robertson JA in NAV Canada viewed Williams as a 
decisive step taken by English law to relax the strict tenets of the consideration 
doctrine.37 Williams was seen to have heralded the demise of consideration in 
contract modifications. In that case, the defendant had engaged the plaintiff as 
subcontractors to carry out carpentry work on a block of 27 flats. Before the works 
could be completed, the plaintiff got into financial difficulties. Anxious to avoid 
a time penalty under the main contract, the defendant promised to pay the 
plaintiff an additional sum of £10,300 at the rate of £575 for each refurbished 
31 NAV Canada (n 9) [53].
32 NAV Canada (n 9) [60].
33 NAV Canada (n 9) [47]–[48] and [61]–[63].
34 NAV Canada (n 9) [50], [63], endorsing the arguments of M H Ogilvie in ‘Forbearance and Economic 
Duress: Three Strikes and You’re Still Out at the Ontario Court of Appeal’ (2004) 29 Queen’s Law 
Journal 809, 821.
35 NAV Canada (n 9) [64]–[67].
36 Antons (n 8) [92]–[93].
37 NAV Canada (n 9) [26].
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flat. The plaintiff then went on to substantially complete the works on eight more 
flats but received only one further payment of £1,500 from the defendant. The 
plaintiff then sued and recovered the promised additional payments in respect of 
the completed flats. The English Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s 
promise did not fail for want of consideration because it stood to enjoy ‘practical 
benefits’, viz. ensuring the continuance of the work, avoiding the trouble and 
expense of having to engage another subcontractor, avoiding liability for delay 
damages to the owners under the main contract, and replacing a haphazard 
scheme of payment with a more structured one involving the payment of a fixed 
sum upon completion of each flat.38 The ‘practical benefits’ so identified are thus 
the factual or incidental advantages that a contracting party would derive from 
the counter-party’s performance over his breach of an existing contractual 
obligation. It also appears there is no requirement for such benefits to materialise, 
so long as they were probable at the time of the variation.39 
‘Practical benefits’ as elicited from Williams v Roffey Bros are widely thought to 
be illusory. For example, Professor Coote has argued that because a bilateral 
contract is formed by an exchange of consideration at the point of formation, actual 
performance and the advantages which result from it come too late to qualify as 
consideration.40 ‘Practical benefits’ cannot therefore be found in actual 
performance or the advantages resulting therefrom. In an earlier work, Professor 
Chen-Wishart likewise criticised ‘practical benefits’ as a concept that comprises 
nothing more than what was already promised, that introduces unacceptable 
uncertainty in the law, and that may lead to the collapse of the doctrine of 
consideration by blurring the line between consideration and mere subjective 
motive.41 Indeed, at its broadest, ‘practical benefits’ could include any matter that 
is subjectively valued by the promisor. On this view, the term is void of content 
and vulnerable to abuse as a guise under which courts choose to give effect to 
contract modifications unsupported by (legal) consideration.42 For these reasons, 
Williams v Roffey has come to be viewed as an authority that flatly contradicts the 
38 Williams (n 5) 10–11 (Glidewell LJ), 19 (Russell LJ).
39 As was the case in Williams v Roffey. See Dan Halyk, ‘Consideration, Practical Benefits and Promissory 
Estoppel: Enforcement of Contract Modification Promises in Light of Williams v Roffey Brothers’ (1991) 
55 Saskatchewan Law Review 393, 399. The difficulties associated with this extension are discussed 
in Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘Consideration: Practical Benefit and the Emperor’s New Clothes’ in Jack 
Beatson and Daniel Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press 1995), 
129–131.
40 Brian Coote, ‘Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law’ (1990) 3 Journal of Contract Law 23, 26. 
41 Chen-Wishart (n 39) 123–24, 131–32, 138. See also Norma Hird and Ann Blair, ‘Minding Your 
Own Business—Williams v Roffey Revisited: Consideration Re-considered’ [1996] Journal of Business 
Law 254, 256–57; and Halyk (n 39) 398.
42 See eg Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘The Enforceability of Additional Contractual Promises: A Question 
of Consideration?’ (1991) 14 New Zealand Universities Law Review 270, 279 (but the author 
has since developed an alternative interpretation of ‘practical benefits’, see Mindy Chen-Wishart, 
‘A Bird in the Hand—Consideration and Contract Modifications’ in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), 
Contract Formation and Parties (OUP 2010). 
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pre-existing duty rule in Stilk v Myrick,43 and which has the practical effect of 
jettisoning consideration in the context of contract modifications.44 A recent 
iterance of this view was made by Coote in support of the outcome in both Antons 
and NAV Canada:
In the real world, no one in a position like that of the head contractor in Roffey Bros 
would, in his or her right mind, and in a commercial context, promise additional pay-
ment without the hope or expectation of receiving at least some practical benefit in 
return, whether covenanted or not, and even if a main motive were no more than the 
self-satisfaction of having given assistance to a party who was under obligation to him or 
her. So it is inconceivable that, on the reasoning in Roffey Bros, any agreement to vary a 
contract, intended to be binding in law, could ever fail merely for want of consideration. 
For practical purposes therefore, the result was (and is) effectively the same as dispensing 
altogether with any such requirement.45
But one may object that this was not what Williams v Roffey decided. Williams v 
Roffey did not discard consideration but affirmed its place in contract modifications 
by enlarging its scope to include more factual benefits.46 In practice, the performance 
of an obligation is often of more economic value than the mere right to seek redress 
for breach because a successful plaintiff is rarely adequately compensated in full.47 
This ‘bird-in-hand’ line of reasoning has long been urged48 and is consistent with 
the rule that the law does not assess the adequacy of consideration.49 Further, it is 
not the case that a promisor would stand to enjoy factual benefits in every contract 
modification, as there will be instances where the benefits are too de minimis to be 
real.50 So while ‘practical benefits’ is a broad concept, it is not limitless. The receipt 
of performance is thus of more value than a mere promise to perform.
Moreover, ‘practical benefits’ may be distinguished from mere motive. A 
persuasive instance of that was undertaken by Chen-Wishart in a recent article.51 
43 See Chen-Wishart, ‘The Enforceability of Additional Contractual Promises’ (n 42) 278; and 
Margaret Ogilvie, ‘Of What Practical Benefit is Practical Benefit to Consideration?’ (2011) 62 
University of New Brunswick Law Journal 131, 133–34.
44 See Halson (n 6) and Phang (n 6).
45 Brian Coote, ‘Variations Sans Consideration’ (2011) 27 Journal of Contract Law 185, 187.
46 Francis Dawson, ‘Contract as Assumption and Consideration Theory: A Reassessment of Williams 
v Roffey Bros’ (2011) 42(1) Victoria University Wellington Law Review 135, 158.
47 As Chen-Wishart put it, ‘[w]e bargain for performance, but what we get is a more fragile right in 
remedial terms. The unpalatable truth is that there is no straightforward equivalence between the 
two.’ Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42) 93.
48 C J Hamson, ‘The Reform of Consideration’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 233, 238; Arthur 
Lehman Goodhart, ‘Performance of an Existing Duty as Consideration’ (1956) 72 Law Quarterly 
Review 490, 492.
49 Dawson (n 45) 156.
50 This may be the case where, for instance, the contract is already very near its end. In the Singaporean 
Court of Appeal decision in Sea-Land Service Inc v Cheong Fook Chee Vincent [1994] 3 SLR 631 (SCA) 
635, it was found that an employer who had promised enhanced severance payment to a retrenched 
employee had derived no factual benefit from the latter’s work in the last month of his employment 
since a company would only retrench employees who were no longer essential to its operations.
51 Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42). 
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Building on the ‘bird-in-hand’ principle, the learned author rationalised Williams 
v Roffey as a case where the contract to modify took effect as a unilateral contract. 
In other words, the main contractor’s offer to pay more was a unilateral offer (or 
a series of unilateral offers) that would be accepted as and when the carpentry 
work on each flat was completed. Consideration thus resides in the performance 
rather than the promise. Since a unilateral contract is formed only upon the 
receipt of performance, this approach avoids the conceptual difficulty associated 
with that based on bilateral contracting, where performance is said to arrive too 
late to qualify as consideration.52 It also explains why, if the sub-contractor 
(promisee) fails to perform, the underlying contract is revived and damages are 
assessed on the terms of the original contract rather than the terms of the failed 
modification.53 Accordingly, on the facts of Williams v Roffey, the sub-contractor 
was awarded the higher sums only in respect of the flats that were substantially 
completed but not the remaining unfurnished flats.54
This unilateral contract device has the obvious advantage of placing a logical 
and objective limit on the concept of practical benefits.55 But if one accepts as a 
starting premise that actual performance is more valuable than a mere right to 
performance, then might not a more straightforward explanation of Williams v 
Roffey lie in the recognition that a re-promise does confer additional value on the 
counter-party if the re-promise represents an increased chance of performance?56 If 
actual performance is an end that a contracting party may rationally acquire, 
why could he not similarly give good value in exchange for an increased chance of 
performance? The law regularly gives effect to bargains struck for the acquisition of 
a chance. A contract for (lawful) wagers is the classic example. More pertinently, 
a person who has already purchased a lottery ticket may also improve his chance 
of winning by purchasing more tickets of the same series. No one would sensibly 
52 Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42) 96.
53 Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42) 97.
54 But the remedies awarded in the case are also consistent with an analysis based on bilateral 
contracting since both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had accepted that the obligation to 
pay the increased amount was conditional upon the completion (or substantial completion) of work in 
respect of each flat. See Williams v Roffey (n 5) 8.
55 But it has been observed that this mechanism is somewhat complex, and the supposition that all 
contract modifications are effected by way of unilateral contracts may in many cases run counter to 
parties’ intention. See Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (9th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 83. It 
may be reasonable to surmise, for example, that Roffey Bros (the defendants) would not have agreed 
to the variation if it had known at the time that the new agreement did not oblige Williams (the 
plaintiff) to perform but merely gave him an option to do so. Of course, this may be of little practical 
significance if Williams was still bound to perform under the original contract. But the remedial 
consequences of bilateral and unilateral contracting may differ depending on the precise time at 
which the contract is said to have been formed, and this difference may sometimes be crucial. 
56 Chen-Wishart (n 39) 128. At first sight, this proposition may appear to contradict Chen-Wishart’s 
main thesis in her more recent work (Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42)) which contends 
that it is the critical distinction between receipt of performance and the mere right to perform that 
renders it necessary to resort to the unilateral contract device. But this is not necessarily so. To 
acknowledge that performance is worth more than a mere promise does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility that the same promise cannot confer different values in different circumstances. 
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suggest that the subsequent purchase is void for want of consideration since the 
value of the increased chance is one that can be statistically proven. In the same 
vein, it may be argued that Roffey Bros had by promising more payment acquired 
a real chance of improved performance. It will be recalled that in that case, it was 
the subcontractor’s financial difficulties—caused in part by the under-pricing of 
the original sub-contract—that were threatening to impede performance. It must 
thus have been clear that any additional payment received by the subcontractor 
would go towards alleviating the impediment he was facing and correspondingly 
improve the chance of completion.57 That such increased payments were common 
practice in the construction industry58 further attested to the objective value of 
the advantage that would accrue to the main contractor.59 So understood, the 
consideration or ‘practical benefits’ found in Williams v Roffey were not merely the 
promisor’s subjective hope or motive but a fact objectively identified in the same 
way that the likelihood of any other factual occurrence is assessed. On this view, 
the benefits that a contracting party derives from a re-promise are not illusory. 
They are valuable not only in the eyes of the parties but also in the eyes of the law. 
It is true, of course, that this interpretation of Williams v Roffey would still severely 
undermine the pre-existing duty rule and may well approach the dispensation-
route in effect, i.e., by validating the vast majority of contractual variations. But 
the precise analytical technique, in emphasising the need to locate an exchange of 
value, diverges sharply from an approach that altogether side-steps that enquiry. 
As the discussion below will demonstrate, this divergence may have more than 
theoretical significance.
e ModIfIcAtIons, IntentIon And PolIcy
In Antons, the court placed considerable weight on the importance of giving effect 
to agreements where the parties had expressed the unequivocal intention to be bound.60 
Indeed, it appeared to have regarded the parties’ intention as sufficient and 
paramount, such that the only function of consideration, if it remained relevant 
57 Reynolds and Treitel have also argued that the fact of under-price is a consideration that favours 
enforcement: ‘The conduct of the promisor might, again, be relevant if in the original contract he 
secured some harsh or unfair advantage over the promisee—if, for example, he employed the 
promisee at rates of pay well below the current ones. The suggestion here is not that the court should 
reopen the transaction for inadequacy of consideration. But where the parties themselves have reopened it on 
this ground, the court should enforce their new agreement.’ Francis Reynolds and Guenter Treitel, 
‘Consideration for the Modification of Contracts’ (1965) 7 Malaya Law Review 1, [20] (emphasis 
added).
58 A point raised by counsel for the subcontractor in argument, see Williams v Roffey (n 5) 4. 
59 Indeed, it is significant that counsel for the main contractor had conceded that his client had secured 
benefits from promising to pay more notwithstanding that complete performance was not eventually 
rendered. See Williams v Roffey (n 5) 16. 
60 Antons (n 8) [93]. 
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at all, was as a ‘valuable signal that the parties intend to be bound by their 
agreement’.61 The main difficulty with this line of argument is that it does not 
explain why consideration should only be dispensed with in cases involving 
modifications. If the parties’ intention were the only relevant criterion, surely it 
must follow that all agreements (including ‘fresh’ agreements) should be enforced 
on that ground.62 That would, in effect, spell the complete demise of the doctrine 
of consideration. To suggest that the doctrine of intention is a more useful mark 
of legal enforceability also overlooks the fact that the intention to create legal 
relations is presumed in the vast majority of cases involving commercial cases or 
arms-length bargains.63 In practice, that will have the effect of presumptively 
validating all contract variations, thus rendering the search for ‘intention’ a 
hollow exercise.64 More worryingly, the language of intention together with the 
operation of the presumption would, by appealing to the notion of private 
autonomy, tend to mask the public policies that are at work in judicial decision-
making.65
By way of contrast, a more compelling case for consideration-free modifications 
was put forward in NAV Canada when the court explicitly based its decision on 
‘policy reasons’.66 These reasons were the need to protect parties’ reliance, to 
improve certainty in the law, and most crucially, to facilitate commercially 
efficacious one-sided modifications.67 They underscored the belief that contractual 
modifications are beneficial and hence ought to be enabled by the law. To the 
extent that the doctrine of consideration hinders this policy, it has to give way. All 
that is needed to establish a valid modification is the parties’ true agreement or 
consent.
On this view, the formation and modification of contracts are distinct 
phenomena. But this is hardly a novel observation. As Karl Llewellyn had 
observed in 1931: 
61 ibid.
62 Chen-Wishart, ‘A Bird in the Hand’ (n 42) 106; Craig Ulyatt, ‘The Demise of Consideration for 
Contract Variations’ (2000–2003) 9 Auckland University Law Review 1386, 1395; and Karen N 
Scott, ‘From Sailors to Fisherman: Contractual Variation and the Abolition of the Pre-existing Duty 
Rule in New Zealand’ (2005) 11 Canterbury Law Review 201, 216. 
63 Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349 (QBD) 355.
64 Thus, Hedley concludes that no intention to create legal relations is really required in these cases. 
See Steve Hedley, ‘Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforceability of Informal 
Agreements’ (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 391, 412.
65 A point repeatedly made by commentators: see J Unger, ‘Intention to Create Legal Relations, 
Mutuality and Consideration’ (1956) 19 Modern Law Review 96; Hedley (n 63); Bob Hepple, 
‘Intention to Create Legal Relations’ (1970) 28 Cambridge Law Journal 122, 134; Roger 
Brownsword, ‘Of Cups and Coins and Contracts’ (1976) 27 Northern Island Legal Quarterly 414; 
Gregory Klass, ‘Intent to Contract’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 1437, 1459–60; Ilija Vickovich, 
‘The Modern Animus Contrahendi: Focusing on Intention Through a ‘Contemporary Lens’’ (2011) 
13 Flinders Law Journal 95.
66 NAV Canada (n 9) [27].
67 ibid [28].
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Law and logic go astray whenever [additional or modifying business promises] are 
regarded as truly comparable to new agreements. They are not. No business man regards 
them so. They are going-transaction adjustments, as different from agreement-formation 
as are corporate organization and corporate management; and the line of legal dealing 
with them which runs over waiver and estoppel is based on sound intuition.68
Contract modifications are thus the usual incidents in the life of a contract. 
They are needed to fill gaps and cure defects discoverable only in the course of 
performance. Generally, the immediate aim of a party who agrees to a concession 
is not to acquire ‘fresh’ benefits, but to preserve the benefits of the original 
bargain. That being the case, it is not relevant to insist on additional consideration.69 
Contracting parties would benefit from the outright recognition of modifications 
sans consideration as prima facie valid because that would facilitate the achievement 
of the objective that motivated the formation of the contract in the first place.70 
At the same time, the function of contracts as the essential legal and social 
machinery for rearranging productive energy71 is better served. 
It may be pointed out that this policy concern is not, in substance, too different 
from the notion of value or practical benefits discussed in the previous section. 
Indeed, both analyses are built upon the benefits of modifications with a view to 
enabling performance so it is unsurprising that both would, in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, uphold contract modifications as validly formed. Nevertheless, 
the technique employed by each approach is distinct and this distinction may well 
affect the analysis of a contractual modification in other ways. By recognising 
that even an ostensibly one-sided modification may involve an exchange, Williams 
v Roffey preserves the conception of contractual promises as bargains.72 For it is 
not the mere phenomenon of agreement, but an agreement for the exchange of 
values recognised as sufficient by the law, that gives the modification its legal 
force. On the other hand, a broad-brush dispensation, even if similarly motivated 
by the desire to facilitate performance of the original contract, strips the promise 
of its reciprocal quality and leaves the element of consent—manifested by offer, 
acceptance and intention—as its core constituent. In turn, this may (though it is 
not an inevitable consequence) engender the misconception that since it is consent 
alone that validates the modification, the only reasons for invalidation are those 
that negate consent.73 As the discussion below will seek to demonstrate, this was 
the erroneous assumption that led the court in NAV Canada to embrace ‘consent’ 
68 Karl Llewellyn, ‘What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective’ (1931) 40 Yale Law Journal 704, 
742.
69 Samuel Stoljar, ‘The Modification of Contracts’ (1957) 35 Canadian Bar Review 485, 486–87. 
70 Tan Cheng Han, ‘Contract Modifications, Consideration and Moral Hazard’ (2005) 17 SACLJ 566, 
578.
71 Llewellyn (n 68) 717.
72 Which still provides the most compelling explanation for contractual liability because ‘[the] conceptual 
core of contract is the self-interested exchange’. Chen-Wishart (n 7) 451.
73 ibid 446.
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in place of ’illegitimacy’ as the conceptual substratum of the doctrine of economic 
duress. 
f econoMIc duress
In NAV Canada, Robertson JA took the view that genuinely agreed contract 
modifications though unsupported by consideration should be enforceable unless 
procured by duress. The lack of consent is therefore the ‘true cornerstone’ of the 
doctrine of duress.74 This conception of duress also led the learned judge to reject 
‘illegitimate pressure’ and adopt the absence of practical alternatives as the key 
diagnostic concept. In his view, the notion of illegitimacy is unhelpful because it 
says nothing about the reality of the coercee’s consent. The existence or lack of 
adequate alternatives, on the other hand, is direct evidence of the impact of the 
pressure exerted on the coercee. On this approach, the questions whether a 
contractual modification has been formed, and whether it is voidable for duress, are 
collapsed as a single enquiry centering on the notion of consent.75 
If ‘consent’ connotes an intentional or voluntary act, this analysis is problematic 
and retrogressive. The point is now trite that a person being coerced does 
succumb, so that ‘the more extreme the pressure, the more real is the consent of 
the victim.’76 Hence, a contract procured by coercion is not vitiated because 
consent is absent but because it is procured in circumstances the law regards as 
objectionable.77 As Professor Aityah had warned, the language of ‘consent’ is 
bound to mislead because it could be understood literally to require only a finding 
of fact concerning the victim’s subjective will.78 
It may be that by ‘lack of consent’ Robertson JA really had in mind defective 
rather than un-willed consent. Consent procured under pressure is defective or 
‘unfree’ when the coerced party had no choice in the decision, and choice is absent 
when ‘the only alternatives to entering into the contract, including doing nothing, 
are undesirable alternatives.’79 This interpretation is consistent with the emphasis 
that Robertson JA placed on the availability of practical alternatives as the (non-
conclusive) hallmark of consent. This leaves unanswered the question: how is a 
74 NAV Canada (n 9) [7].
75 An approach commended for its ‘considerable simplicity and elegance’: see Margaret Ogilvie, 
‘Economic Duress: an Elegant and Practical Solution’ (2011) 3 Journal of Business Law 229, 242
76 Patrick Atiyah, ‘Economic Duress and the Overborne Will’ (1982) 98 Law Quarterly Review 197, 
200. See also Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The Universe 
Sentinel) [1983] 1 AC 366, 400; Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 
NSWLR 40 (New South Wales Court of Appeal (NSWCA)) 45–46. 
77 Thus rendering the contract ‘defeasible’: see Chen-Wishart (n 7) 446.
78 Atiyah (n 76) 202. 
79 Stephen A Smith, ‘Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law 
Journal 343, 361. See also Elisabeth MacDonald, ‘Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract’ [1989] 
Journal of Business Law 460, 464–67. 
202 Contract Modifications ouclj vol 12 no 2
practical alternative to be identified? Specifically, should a subjective (ie ‘practical’ 
as determined by the coercee) or an objective standard (ie ‘practical’ as determined 
by the law) be applied to discover such alternatives?80 In NAV Canada, Robertson 
JA gave short shrift to this aspect of the analysis by alluding to it as a question of 
judgment as well as evidence.81 Bearing in mind that the learned judge had already 
rejected the objective limits inherent in ‘illegitimate pressure’, applying a subjective 
standard would lead to the alarming result that a contractual modification may be 
rescinded for duress so long as the victim adduces satisfactory evidence of an honest 
belief that there was no practical alternative. This would dramatically enlarge the 
scope of the doctrine of economic duress and destabilise contract modifications. It 
would also undermine the policy for eliminating consideration in the first place,82 
which is to facilitate contract variations and promote performance. In the light of 
that, an objective determination of ‘practical alternative’ should be preferred. So 
a practical alternative is not merely a possible course of conduct but also one that 
the coercee ought to have taken in the circumstances, as assessed by the court.83 A 
significant normative dimension is thus implicit in the test—it requires the court 
to assess the practicability of the alternatives as well as the reasonableness of the 
coercee’s decision in bypassing them.84
Despite its subjective facade, ‘consent’, like ‘illegitimacy’, is a value-laden 
concept. Without identifying the values and policies that ought to guide the court 
in evaluating the victim’s post-threat options, ‘consent’ and ‘practical alternatives’ 
are mere appellations that provide scant guidance in their application. 
Consequently, the uncertainty that Robertson JA regards as objectionable in 
‘illegitimacy’ is also present in ‘consent’.
A consent based analysis centering on the absence of choice is also flawed 
because it obscures the reality that contractual autonomy is never absolute. In the 
commercial context, such autonomy is principally constrained by limited access 
to resources. It is further curtailed every time a decision is made to commit 
resources to particular activities. The very act of contracting is, therefore, itself a 
cause of the ‘no choice’ phenomenon. For that reason, a complete solution cannot 
be found in an exclusive focus on the absence of choice. Applying the ‘no-option’ 
criterion bluntly results in circularity.
80 This must be distinguished from the question of causation, i.e. whether the coercee succumbed 
because he had no reasonable alternative. In this context, there is clearly a need to establish subjective 
inducement. See Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] l Lloyd’s Rep 620 (England and Wales 
High Court (Commercial Division) (EWHC (Comm))) 638 (Mance J). 
81 NAV Canada (n 9) [55] (Robertson JA).
82 S M Waddams, ‘Unconscionable Contracts: Competing Perspectives’ (1999) 62 Saskatchewan Law 
Review 1, 8.
83 Bigwood (n 26) 275–76. Cf M H Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress in Contract: Departure, Detour or 
Dead End?’ (2001) 34 Canadian Business Law Journal 194, 223 (Argued that the absence of practical 
alternatives is the more appropriate test for economic duress because it is ‘externally and factually 
verifiable’).
84 See MacDonald (n 79) 467.
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By contrast, the concept of ‘illegitimacy’ explicitly reflects the moral basis on 
which the doctrine of economic duress is founded.85 The doctrine is not so much 
concerned with protecting a victim’s choices per se, as it is with protecting a 
victim’s vulnerability to exploitative behaviour that undermines that victim’s 
choices. Contrary to Robertson JA’s assertion,86 there is no unfettered ‘right’ to 
break a contract.87 
A breach (and, by the same token, a threatened breach) of contract may not 
involve the same degree of moral infraction that is typical of common law crimes, 
yet it may in certain circumstances fall short of prevailing ethical expectations. 
Thus, illegitimacy or exploitation is to be identified by examining the entire 
interaction between the parties rather than a one-sided focus on the coercee’s 
reactions. An account of the doctrine that evaluates the conduct of both parties 
to the transaction provides a more convincing justification for excusing the 
coercee from their obligations and depriving the coercer of their rights.88 
Of course, a moralised account of the doctrine is open to criticism on account 
of its susceptibility to indeterminacy.89 Nevertheless, the test laid down in Universe 
Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation,90 has been 
favourably received in a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions,91 including 
Canada.92 There is, therefore, significant support for the concept as a workable 
criterion, even though its precise content seems to vary from society to society.93 
Crucially, ‘illegitimacy’, not being a monolithic concept, is not reducible to a 
single test or an exhaustive list of determinants.94 Rather, it encapsulates all of the 
85 Rick Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ (1996) 46 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 201, 206.
86 NAV Canada (n 9) [46] (Robertson JA).
87 The term ‘right’ is clearly not intended as a Hohfeldian claim-right but is more accurately a liberty 
to breach subject to the liability to pay damages. This draws from the Holmesian view that a 
contracting party may choose either to perform or breach on payment of damages but suffers from 
the fundamental weakness that it seeks to equate a contractual right with the remedy that vindicates 
it. See eg Daniel Friedman, ‘The Efficient Breach Fallacy’ (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 1. 
88 Hamish Stewart, ‘A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 175, 199; Bigwood (n 26) 271–72.
89 See Andrew Phang, ‘Economic Duress: Recent Difficulties and Possible Alternatives’ [1997] 
Restitution Law Review 53, 57–58.
90 [1983] 1 AC 366 (HL).
91 See eg Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40 (NSWCA); 
McIntyre v Nemesis DNK Ltd [2009] NZCA 329; Sharon Global Solutions Pte Ltd v LG International (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [2001] 2 SLR(R) 233 (SHC); E C Investment Holding Pte Ltd v Ridout Residence Pte Ltd 
[2011] 2 SLR 232 (SHC).
92 Three cases decided by the Ontario Court of Appeal are commonly cited: Stott v Merit Investment Corp 
(1988) 63 OR (2d) 545 (Ontario Supreme Court, Court of Appeal (OSCA)); Gordon v Roebuck reflex 
(1992) 9 OR (3d) 1 (Ontario Court of Appeal (OCA)); Techform Products Ltd v Wolda (2001) 56 OR (3d) 
1 (OCA). These authorities were criticised by Robertson JA as unthinking reception of the ‘illegitimacy’ 
test into Canadian law. See NAV Canada (n 9) [44]. 
93 See Bigwood (n 85) 229. So illegitimacy has been equated with the doctrine of unconscionability in 
equity in Australia: see Ross McKeand, ‘Economic Duress—Wearing the Clothes of Unconscionable 
Conduct’ (2001) 17 Journal of Contract Law 1.
94 Nelson Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) [3-004].
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factors that are relevant to the assessment of the parties’ conduct at the time of 
renegotiation. Under this analytical framework, the absence of practical 
alternatives is a weighty factor as it sheds light on both the reasonableness of the 
coercee’s conduct as well as the causal link between the threat and the concession. 
However, it cannot be the exclusive determinant of illegitimacy. Contrary to 
Robertson JA’s view in NAV Canada the coercer’s motivation or state of mind is an 
important factor. An intention to profit from another’s vulnerability in the 
absence of any justification (such as the need to respond to an unanticipated 
change in circumstance) is an indisputable instance of ‘illegitimacy’.95 Conversely, 
the threatening party’s ‘good faith’ (ie an honest belief that they are entitled to 
make the threat) may legitimise a threat to breach a contract.96 However, this 
does not (contrary to Robertson JA’s approach in NAV Canada) mean that ‘good 
faith’ will always negate duress because the threatening party’s state of mind is 
just one of the various factors in the assessment of legitimacy.97 So even if the 
coercer honestly believed it had the right to threaten non-performance, the threat 
would be illegitimate if it was found to be an attempt to avoid a circumstance that 
the coercer had himself created or to reallocate a risk that he had previously 
assumed.98 Indeed, the outcome in NAV Canada is better explained on this ground. 
By threatening non-performance, NAV was clearly attempting to relieve itself of 
a contractual risk it had previously assumed. This constituted illegitimate pressure 
even if NAV honestly thought it had the right to do so.
In NAV Canada, Robertson JA was eager to restore certainty to the law by 
stripping it of value assessments. To that end, an assent-centred approach was 
selected as it has the impression of a generally fact-based enquiry shorn of value 
judgment. Such an approach is fundamentally misconceived. It wrongly assumes 
that consent is all that is required for contract formation and the absence of 
consent is what it takes to vitiate the agreement. As we have seen, however, the 
doctrine of duress requires a normative evaluation of the propriety and 
95 The classic example is D&C Builders v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617 (EWHC (Comm)). Notably, this was also 
a point conceded by Robertson JA in NAV Canada in spite of his preference for a victim-centred 
approach. see NAV Canada (n 9) [48]. The relevance of the coercer’s state of mind has also been 
accepted in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. In McIntyre v Nemesis DNK Ltd [2009] NZCA 329 
[35], a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the finding that the alleged coercer did not set 
out to deliberately harm the contractual relationship was thought to be significant in negating 
illegitimate pressure. See also Sharon Global Solutions Pte Ltd v LG International (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2001] 
2 SLR(R) 233, [30] (SHC).
96 See DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services Asa [2000] EWHC 185 (TCC) (England and Wales High 
Court (Techonology and Construction Court)) and Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd [2001] 
BLR 1 (EWHC).
97 Enonchong (n 94) [3-012]. Moreover, little or no weight will be attached to a party’s ‘good faith’ if 
it is founded on a wholly unreasonable belief: Adam Opel GmbH and another v Mitras Automotive UK Ltd 
[2007] EWHC 3252, [34] (QB) (David Donaldson QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High 
Court)).
98 North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd, The Atlantic Baron [1979] 1 QB 705 (EWHC 
(Comm)). For a more recent example, see Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] All ER 
(D) 122 (EWHC).
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reasonableness of the parties’ conduct and it cannot meaningfully be reduced to 
a factual enquiry on ‘consent’. It is true, of course, that the normative criteria of 
‘illegitimacy’ would invite the exercise of judicial discretion and thereby generate 
uncertainty. However the exercise of discretion to discriminate between factual 
situations in order to decide what is just and fair is the very essence of the courts’ 
function.99
G conclusIon
The questions of whether a contractual modification has been formed, and of 
whether a modification be set aside despite the outward coincidence of offer and 
acceptance, raise complex policy issues and questions of value. The solutions 
devised in both Antons and NAV Canada have the appeal of simplicity and avoid 
the awkwardness of stretching the concept of consideration beyond its traditional 
boundaries. However, a close inspection of the reasoning employed in both cases 
reveals the risk that the abandonment of consideration may reduce the issues 
surrounding contract modifications to one of mere ‘intention’ or ‘consent’, or 
other like expressions of private autonomy. At worst, such reductionism may 
threaten to exclude pertinent policy considerations, including the policy that 
prompted removal of consideration in the first place.
The same risk may, of course, inhere in the patchwork approach that is 
currently found in English law, especially if the ‘practical benefits’ considered in 
Williams v Roffey are no more than illusory. What this article has sought to do is 
to persuade the reader that an alternative view is both possible and plausible. 
‘Practical benefits’ constitute real consideration if the law recognises the reality 
that commercial parties are prepared to purchase an increased chance of 
performance. On this view, Williams v Roffey reinforces the orthodoxy that 
contractual promises are more than agreements.100 Likewise, the doctrine of 
duress is not predicated on the absence of agreements but on the need to delineate 
minimum standards of ethical behaviour in renegotiating contracts. There is, 
admittedly, no simple means of framing those standards but the notion of 
‘illegitimacy’ underscores the need to identify a material degree of impropriety. 
The practicality of the coercee’s options, or their absence, may shed light on the 
quality of the coercer’s conduct but it does not displace the broader appraisal of 
the parties’ interaction.
99 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s L Rep 620 (QBD) 637–38.
100 Hamson (n 48) 234 (‘Consideration, offer and acceptance are an indivisible trinity, facets of one 
identical notion which is that of bargain.’).
